THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH ERA
A.W. Maldonado

It was no surprise. Five months before the elections, June 1, 2008, I began a column:
“The Popular Democratic Party is headed toward a catastrophic defeat with historic consequences for Puerto Rico. “

It was evident that Acevedo was doomed by the economic crisis. Long before the March 27, 2008 federal indictments for campaign finance irregularities, the polls showed that there was no way that Acevedo could get reelected. A November , 2007 poll had him losing to Resident Commissioner Luis Fortuño by no less than 37 points.

But he made a fateful decision after the indictments. Against reality, he convinced many Popular Party leaders, including the mayors that are crucial in elections, that he would pull off a “political miracle.”

Acevedo has always been a resourceful politician. Now he used the federal indictment to convince many PDP leaders that the U.S. government had immorally, undemocratically, abusively intervened in island politics to destroy him and favor Fortuño. The Puerto Rican electorate, we now know, did not believe him. But many PDP leaders, in patriotic indignation, did and rallied to his side.

Fortuño and Resident Commissioner-elect Pedro Pierluisi represent a new generation and they will bring energy in attacking Puerto Rico’s overwhelming economic and fiscal crisis. They are both intelligent and honest and there is no doubt they sincerely want to serve this island well.

But they will have to suppress two forces within their party. One consists of a number of vindictive and destructive leaders, passionately loyal to ex-governor Pedro Rosselló, that dedicated themselves to obstruct the Acevedo administration, and then to destroy Fortuño himself. Fortuño’s first test, crucial to the success of his administration, will be whether he will prevent these militants from controlling the Legislature.

The second force that Fortuño will have to suppress is the status passion within the New Progressive Party. With absolute control of the government of Puerto Rico – the governorship, the resident commissioner, the Legislature, the vast majority of the municipalities, and eventually the island Supreme Court – the NPP will have the power to launch a crusade for statehood, here and in Washington, as never before in island history.

Fortuño and Pierluisi are statehooders. They repeatedly declare that they will do nothing here nor in Congress that is not consistent with statehood. This was precisely the mentality that drove then governor Rosselló in the 1990’s to go to Congress to eliminate Section 936.

But they will face the reality that to lift Puerto Rico from the deepening economic recession they will have to do things that are inconsistent with statehood. The island economy depends on manufacturing and manufacturing depends on Puerto Rico being part of the U.S. but exempt of U.S. taxes. We know today that the elimination of Section 936 was a serious blow to manufacturing costing this island thousands of jobs.

So the fundamental question is whether Fortuño’s and Pierluisi’s extraordinary electoral victory means the end the Commonwealth Era.

Let’s define precisely just what the Commonwealth Era was. This is not just about a political status, but about an era. In most of the first half of the 20th century, it seemed nothing worked in Puerto Rico. Nothing pulled this island out of deep extreme poverty, not hundreds of million in federal funds. The politics was superficial, irrelevant. Everyone in Puerto Rico said that the fundamental cause was “colonialism.” But in fact, Puerto Rico has placed itself in an impossible dilemma. It was believed that the only way out of “colonialism” was statehood or independence. But statehood was economically, culturally, politically impossible. And the vast majority of the Puerto Ricans rejected independence.

It occurred to a number of island leaders, and Congress agreed, in the early 1950’s, to liberate Puerto Rico from this paralyzing dilemma by creating a new status, Commonwealth. It was unique, and in some ways defective, but it was a solution. And it worked. By the end of the 1950’s, Puerto Rico’s liberated energy and talent has carried out an “economic miracle” and made this island a Mecca for world-famous musicians, artists, poets, intellectuals.

The Commonwealth Era did not, of course, end the status conflict. But it did bring about a kind of truce. If someone invented a meter to gauge the ups and downs of status passion in island history, I think it would show a correlation: the higher the status passions, the more superficial island politics, the more ineffective the government.

So the question is: how high will Fortuño and Pierluisi raise the status passion meter? They say their priority is attacking Puerto Rico’s economic and fiscal crisis. But will they resist the enormous pressure to launch another statehood crusade?

And this brings us back to Acevedo’s fateful decision. Closing one’s eyes to reality is never a good idea. For a political leader the consequences can be serious. Acevedo did and led the PDP to the worst defeat in its history. The stakes were too high to depend on his promise to pull off a “miracle.” He should have given way to someone else with a better chance of at least avoid the PNP landslide: with at least a chance of winning, say, control of the Senate.

Will Fortuño and Pierluis also close their eyes to the reality that if they revert Puerto Rico to the sterility, the futility of the impossible status dilemma, all the enthusiasm and promise of their big victory will flounder in failure? The reality that this is what will happen if they bring aboutthe end of the Commonwealth Era.